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ABSTRACT
We use data from the March 1968-2001 Current Population Surveys to document the evolution of
elderly poverty over this time period, and to assess the causal role of the Social Security program
in reducing poverty rates. We develop an instrumental variable approach that relies on the large
increase in benefits for birth cohorts from 1885 through 1916, and the subsequent decline and
flattening of real benefits growth due to the Social Securing "notch", to estimate the causal effect
of Social Security on elderly poverty. Our findings suggest that over all elderly families the elasticity
of poverty to benefits is roughly unitary. This suggests that reductions in Social Security benefits
would significantly alter the poverty of the elderly.
Gary V. Engelhardt













  One of the most striking trends in elderly well-being in the twentieth century was the 
dramatic decline in income poverty among the elderly.  The official poverty rate of those 65 
years and older was 35 percent in 1960, more than twice that of the non-elderly (those 18-64), 
and had fallen to 10 percent by 1995, below that for the non-elderly.  Smolensky, Danziger and 
Gottschalk (1988) found similar steep declines in elderly poverty back to 1939.  This poverty 
reduction exceeded that for any other group in society.   
The rapid growth in Social Security benefits in the post-World War II period is often 
cited as a major factor in elderly poverty reduction.  This conclusion is based on evidence such 
as that shown in Figure 1, which plots both the elderly poverty rate and Social Security program 
expenditures per capita over time; the figure is rescaled so that both series fit on the same graph.  
There is a striking negative association between these series, with elderly poverty declining 
rapidly as the Social Security program grows quickly in the 1960s and 1970s, and then declining 
more slowly as program growth slows in the 1980s and 1990s.  One concern with potential 
reforms to the Social Security system is that, to the extent they effectively involve benefit 
reduction, the gains in elderly poverty reduction over the last forty years may be reversed.   
Our goal in this paper is to assess the role of Social Security in driving this reduction in 
elderly poverty.  We begin with time series evidence on the growth in Social Security and the 
decline in elderly poverty.  We consider both absolute and relative measures of elderly poverty, 
as well as the heterogeneity in the evolution of elderly poverty.  In particular, we consider first 
whether these changes in poverty were reflected equally among the oldest old, who start with 
much higher poverty rates, and the youngest old; as well as whether the trends were comparable   3
across marital status groups, comparing elders who are married, divorced, widowed, and never 
married.  
We then assess the causal role of Social Security in explaining these trends.  We outline 
the econometric problems in the previous literature on the impact of Social Security on elderly 
income poverty and propose an instrumental variable procedure to circumvent these difficulties.  
We then examine the effect on poverty of the large changes in Social Security benefits for 
cohorts born in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  Of particular interest is the sharp benefits 
changes for birth cohorts from 1906 through 1926.  The early cohorts in this range saw enormous 
exogenous increases in Social Security benefits, partly due to double indexation of the system in 
the early 1970s.  This double indexing was ended in the 1977 Amendments to the Social Security 
Act that generated the so-called “benefits notch.”  The 1977 law grandfathered all individuals 
born before January 1, 1917, under the old benefit rules, but those born in 1917-1921 received 
benefit reductions that were as much as 20 percent lower than observationally equivalent 
individuals in the 1916 birth cohort.  After 1921, benefits were roughly constant in real terms.  It 
is this variation that was first identified by Krueger and Pischke (1992) as a fruitful means of 
identifying the behavioral effects of Social Security, in their case in the context of retirement 
decisions.  We follow their methodology to define an instrumental variable for observed Social 
Security benefits.
1   
We carry out this analysis using data from 1967 through 2000 from the March Current 
Population Survey (CPS), to study those elderly born in 1885 through 1930.  We use these data 
to form income measures for elderly households and families. Elderly households are all living 
                                                 
1 In related papers, Snyder and Evans (2002) and Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2002) used the notch to examine 
the effect of income on mortality and living arrangements, respectively.       4
units in which an elderly person resides; elderly families consist of an elder and his/her spouse.  
So if an elderly couple co-resides with their children, they are in the same household, but 
different families. 
We have several findings of interest.  First, while there has been a major decline in 
absolute poverty among elderly households, that decline has been much smaller for relative 
poverty, which did not decrease in the 1980s and 1990s. This raises the important question of 
whether the elderly should or should not share in the increases in the standard of living realized 
by the non-elderly. Income inequality has also exploded among the elderly in the 1990s.   
Second, these changes in the income position of low income elders are fairly similar 
across age groups, with all age groups following the same basic patterns outlined above.  Third, 
there are important differences in these patterns by marital status group.  In particular, the 
declines in absolute poverty that we see in the data are much stronger for married than for 
unmarried elders. 
Fourth, we document a major causal role of Social Security in driving these time series 
patterns.  Increases in Social Security generosity over time are strongly negatively associated 
with changes in poverty.  There is, however, a weak association with income inequality, 
suggesting that Social Security is benefiting higher income elders at the same or higher rate that 
it benefits low income elders over this period. 
Finally, we illustrate the critical role of elderly living arrangements in driving these 
conclusions.  As we document, there were stark changes in the living arrangements of the elderly 
over the time period we study, with a large shift in living with others to living independently.  
Our regression results show that the effect of Social Security on poverty is much stronger for   5
families than for households, in particular for widows/widowers and divorcees.  This is 
consistent with the findings of Engelhardt, Gruber and Perry (2002) that higher Social Security 
benefits cause more independent living among widowed and divorced elders.  When those elders 
move out on their own, they are in the same family, but they become relatively poor households, 
raising the poverty rate among households.  This offsets to some extent the measured poverty 
reduction among the elderly from higher benefits. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the CPS data. Section III 
charts the time-series evolution of elderly income and poverty from 1967-2000.   Section IV 
outlines the primary method used to determine the impact of Social Security in the previous 
literature and describes the construction of the instrumental variable.  Section V discusses the 
empirical results.  There is a brief conclusion. 
 
II.  Data Construction 
This study uses data from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) of March, 1968 through 
2001.  Each file is a cross sectional nationally representative sample of households.  We restrict 
our analysis to cohorts born starting in 1880 (because our sample is very small before that 
cohort), and ending in 1935, the youngest cohort that turns 65 in our data.   
To construct our main sample, we first assign families within the CPS.  For our purposes, 
a “family” is defined as the household head, his or her spouse, and any children of the household 
head that are living in the household and are under the age of 18.  This differs from the CPS 
family definition in that we assume any other member of the household is his/her own family, 
whereas all individuals related by birth, marriage, and adoption are considered members of the 
CPS family.  Note that there may be more than one “family” in a given CPS “household” (e.g. if   6
there are multiple non-married elderly living together).  Our family definition requires 
consistency in relational measures in the CPS household in the annual surveys.  Because of 
changes in these measures, we were not able to construct our measure of the family prior to the 
March, 1968 CPS.  We use both families and households as our observational unit.   
In order to measure outcomes for any age range, for either households or families, we 
weight the full sample of households/families by the number of persons sharing that 
household/family in the relevant age range.  That is, our estimated poverty rate for 65-69 year 
old “households” is the poverty rate over all households containing a 65-69 year old, weighted 
by the number of persons age 65-69 in that household.  So these are essentially person-weighted 
poverty rates. 
The questions in the March CPS are about income earned in the previous calendar year, 
so that even though we use data from the 1968-2001 surveys, the income data refer to 1967-
2000.  Over time, the CPS has provided more disaggregated questions on income sources, and, 
for some types of income, has changed the wording of questions.  For each year, we used the 
most disaggregated income measures to make our poverty measures, which, following official 
poverty rates, are based on gross income.
2  All income measures were deflated into real 2001 
dollars using the all-items Consumer Price Index (CPI).   
We begin our analysis with the classic absolute poverty measure, whether a family is 
below the federal poverty line.  Specifically, for the household-level analysis, we assigned to 
each household the poverty threshold for the appropriate household size.  Similarly, for the 
family-level analysis, we assigned to each family the threshold for the appropriate size, treating 
                                                 
2 In addition, we constructed poverty measures using a set of more aggregated income measures consistently 
measured across surveys, and the results of our statistical analysis below did not change.  We made no attempt to 
quantify in-kind transfers received (Smeeding, 1986) into our gross income measures.       7
the family as the “household” in the federal threshold definition.  We did not incorporate the age 
65 and older adjustments for one- and two-person households built into the federal thresholds, so 
that we could compare elderly and non-elderly on an equal basis.  This absolute measure of 
poverty has a number of limitations, however.  First, it holds standards of living constant, and 
does not allow for productivity growth.  Specifically, in a mechanical sense, if there is any real 
productivity growth over time, so that real wage growth is positive, then poverty based on the 
federal threshold likely will fall over time, because this measure only adjusts for inflation, not 
real earnings growth.  Second, it is a knife-edge measure that does not capture the depth of 
absolute deprivation.  
As an alternative, we define a relative measure of the poverty line: 40 percent of the 
median income per OECD equivalent of the non-elderly in each calendar year.  Non-elderly are 
defined as individuals 25-54 years old.  We adjust both elderly and non-elderly income by the 
OECD equivalence scale.  The relative measure has an important feature.  It does not hold living 
standards constant.  Holding real elderly income per equivalent constant, elderly poverty will rise 
as median non-elderly income rises.  This relative measure will yield poverty rates that are more 
likely to be pro-cyclical, as median income rises and falls over the business cycle.   
The potential importance of using this relative measure in addition to the absolute 
measure is shown in Figure 2.  This figure graphs real Social Security expenditures per capita as 
well as the ratio of Social Security expenditures per capita to mean nonelderly income per capita.  
The series move in tandem until the mid-1980s, but after that point there is a decline in relative 
Social Security generosity even as benefits continued to slowly rise in real terms. 
In addition, we consider income inequality among the elderly, which we measure as the 
90-10 coefficient of variation (i.e., in each calendar year, the difference in the 90
th and 10
th   8
elderly OECD equivalent income percentiles normalized by mean elderly income).  We also 
considered other variants of poverty measures.  Specifically, we created alternative measures of 
the absolute poverty line based on 133, 150, and 200 percent, respectively, of the relative poverty 
line based on 25 and 50 percent of the non-elderly median income, respectively, and measures 
based on gross and net income.  The results did not differ from those presented below.  For the 
remainder of the analysis, all income measures were based on gross income to be comparable 
with the federal poverty thresholds.  
 
III.  Time-Series Evidence 
Trends Among All Elderly Households 
  We begin our time series analysis by considering trends for all elderly households, before 
turning to subsets of the elderly.  Figure 3 shows the absolute poverty rate for elderly 
households, replicating the result from Figure 1, but adding as well the trends in poverty for 
nonelderly households.  This figure is rescaled so that elderly and nonelderly poverty can be 
shown in comparable terms.  Recall that this graph includes only those born between 1885 and 
1930, so it will not match published statistics for all elderly in each year; but the pattern is very 
similar to published statistics over this time period. 
During the period of most rapid Social Security growth, during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, both elderly and nonelderly poverty are declining.  The difference between the elderly 
and nonelderly emerges in the recession of the elderly 1980s, when nonelderly poverty rose 
dramatically while elderly poverty rose only slightly, and the recession of the early 1990s, where 
elderly and nonelderly poverty followed a similar  pattern. In the 1990s, the decline in   9
nonelderly poverty was much steeper than the decline in elderly poverty.  These findings on the 
relative cyclicality of poverty highlight the protective role of Social Security for the elderly. 
Figure 4 shows the relative poverty rate for the elderly and nonelderly. During the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the relative poverty rate of the elderly was falling, just as was the case 
with absolute poverty, although in this case the declines came against a backdrop of rising non-
elderly relative poverty.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the decline stagnated, so that there was on 
net little change in relative poverty from 1980 through 2000.  The fact that relative poverty did 
not fall, while absolute poverty did, is consistent with the pattern of benefits during the 1980s 
and 1990s shown in Figure 2. 
  Figure 5 shows the evolution of inequality within the elderly over time.  Relative to the 
nonelderly, inequality among the elderly declined significantly from the late 1960s through the 
early 1990s.  But inequality exploded in the late 1990s among the elderly, rising at an even faster 
rate than inequality among the non-elderly. 
 
Families vs. Households 
The analysis thus far has focused on elderly households, which includes both elders and 
others that share their residence.  An alternative means of measuring poverty is just to focus on 
the elders themselves (and their own spouses and children under 18) in a family-level analysis.  
These analyses can potentially yield very different measures of poverty because changes in 
Social Security benefits can change the living arrangements of the elderly.  A number of studies, 
most recent Engelhardt, Gruber and Perry (2002) find that unmarried elders are more likely to 
live on their own as their Social Security benefits rise.  Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2002) 
found that widows were quite sensitive to benefits in their living arrangements, with each 1%   10
rise in benefits found to lead to a 1.3% reduction in the share of widows living with others.  In 
addition, elderly divorcees were even more income elastic in their living arrangements.  But 
those who are never married are less elastic, and those are married are not at all elastic.  Overall, 
averaging across all of these groups, there is a sizeable elasticity of –0.4.   
This time series change in living arrangements is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the 
share of elderly in shared living arrangements over time.  This share dropped precipitously from 
34% in 1967 to 24% by 1982, and then was relatively constant thereafter. This is very consistent 
with the rapid run-up in benefits in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the flattening of benefits in the 
1980s and 1990s, supporting the notion that Social Security benefits are a major determinant of 
living arrangements. 
These findings can have important implications for the measurement of poverty. In 
particular, if higher Social Security benefits make the widowed and divorced more likely to live 
independently, then this will create more elderly households but keep the number of elderly 
families the same (because in our definition of family, elderly living alone or in shared 
arrangements are their own family).  In addition, the “new” elderly households will be 
comparatively poor because they only have elderly in them.  Therefore, the endogenous response 
of living arrangements to benefits will bias downward any estimated poverty improvement 
among elderly households.  This suggests that using a family-level analysis may be more 
appropriate for reflecting Social Security-induced poverty reductions. 
  Figures 7 shows the results for elderly families, rather than elderly households.  For 
absolute poverty, in Figure 7, the pattern for the elderly is similar, but it is not mirrored by the 
non-elderly in this case; the poverty rate of non-elderly families actually rises slightly. Poverty 
rates are much higher, consistent with the notion that there are economies of scale in shared   11
living conditions).  Nevertheless, in these time series data, there is no evidence of a major effect 
of using families rather than households for the analysis. 
 
Trends by Age Group 
  There are dramatic differences in the poverty rates of the “young” and “old” elderly.  In 
2000, households in which 65-69 year olds resided had a poverty rate of 7.5 percent; households 
in which elders ages 80 and above resided had a poverty rate that was almost twice as high, at 
13%.  This raises the question of whether all age groups of elderly have shared equally in these 
dramatic changes in the income distribution. 
  Figure 8 shows the poverty rates by age group, at the household level (parallel to Figures 
3 and 4).  In fact, the patterns are remarkably similar across these age groups.  In every case we 
see the steep decline in poverty in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the much slower decline in 
the 1980s and 1990s.   So there is no evidence here of a relatively large effect on one particular 
age group. 
 
Trends by Marital Status 
  Another important source of dispersion in poverty rates among the elderly is marital 
status.  At the household level, the poverty rate of married elders in 2000 was only 5%; for never 
married elders, it was almost 22%.  For divorced and widowed elders, it was 16-17%.   
  Figure 9 investigate differences in the evolution of income by marital status, for elderly 
households.  In interpreting these figures, it is important to recognize that the composition of 
each group is changing over time.  While the number of married or widowed elders rises by 50% 
from 1967 to 2000, the number of divorced elders rises by almost 500%, and the number of   12
never married elders rises by over 300%.  Thus, patterns in poverty over time could reflect group 
composition changes. 
  Given this caveat, the results for changes in poverty by marital status are quite 
interesting.  It appears that the changes over time for all elderly are driven by the married elderly.  
The patterns are much stronger for married elderly than for other groups.  Particularly striking is 
the lack of poverty decline for never married elderly, who start out with the second highest 
poverty rate in 1967 and have the highest rate of these groups by 2000.   
 
IV.  Identifying the Impact of Social Security 
  The previous literature on poverty is voluminous, and we do not attempt to review it 
here.
3  Instead, we focus on the primary method used to measure the impact of public policies on 
poverty and how that relates to our instrumental variable identification strategy.  Following Jantti 
and Danziger (2000), let i and t index elderly sub-group and calendar year, respectively, F  be 
a function of resources, then  ] ); ( [ z y F P it  is a poverty measure for some income  y  and poverty 
line z .  In addition, let b  denote Social Security income, so that  
b y y + ′ = ,        ( 1 )  
where  y′  is market capital and labor income.  In principle, the impact of Social Security on 
poverty is  




z y F P z y F P it it − ′ = ∆ ,    (2) 
where  F
~
 is the counterfactual distribution of market labor and capital income in the absence of 
Social Security.  In practice, the primary method for analyzing the impact of Social Security on 
                                                 
3 See Jantti and Danziger (2001), Cowell (2001), and Gottschalk and Smeeding (2001) for comprehensive recent 
reviews of various aspects of this literature.   13
poverty has been to calculate the actual difference in poverty using market income and income 
net of taxes and transfers,  
] ); ( [ ] ); ( [ z y F P z y F P it it − ′ = ∆ .     (3) 
There are three problems with ∆  as a measure of the impact of Social Security on 
poverty.  First, it misses is any “crowd out” of real behavior.  In particular, observed capital and 
labor income,  y′ , itself may be a function of benefits, b , if, for example, when faced with an 
unanticipated and permanent increase in benefits, the elderly leave the labor force earlier, reduce 
post-retirement hours of labor supplied, increase consumption and reduce saving, or substitute 
independent for shared living arrangements.
4  Second, survey-based measures of income might 
be subject to reporting error.  Third, to the extent that most of the variation in Social Security 
benefits that identifies ∆  is time-series in nature, there may omitted variables that are correlated 
with changes in poverty rates and Social Security.  For example, lifetime earnings, which enter 
into Social Security benefit calculations, are affected by aggregate productivity and human 
capital accumulation that have been changing across time.  However, because the federal poverty 
thresholds are inflation-adjusted, but not average earnings adjusted, in a mechanical sense, 
poverty rates for successive birth cohorts should be predicted to fall as productivity, human 
capital accumulation, and real lifetime earnings have risen.  Thus, what might appear as an 
inverse correlation between elderly poverty based on absolute measures and Social Security, as 
in our figures, may simply be due to rising aggregate productivity.   That is, even in the absence 
of Social Security having had a causal impact, elderly poverty would appear to have fallen as 
                                                 
4 See Feldstein and Liebman (2001) for a comprehensive recent review of studies on labor supply and saving 
behavior, Sawhill (1988), Hurd (1990), and Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) for earlier reviews.   
Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2002) review the literature on elderly living arrangements.     14
benefits rose.  This would bias estimates toward finding that Social Security lowered elderly 
poverty.   
 
Construction of the Instrument 
To circumvent these problems we place (3) in a regression framework and construct an 
instrumental variable for Social Security benefits independent of omitted time-varying factors 
and based on an exogenous measure of lifetime labor income.  The variation in this instrument 
derives solely from legislative changes in benefits.   
To construct our instrument, we note that all of the identifying variation from the Social 
Security notch is based on year of birth, and divide the underyling CPS micro data into age-by-
calendar year cells, which, of course, are also year-of-birth cells.  The year of birth refers to the 
“Social Security beneficiary,” defined as the male person in the family 65 and older.  If there is 
no male 65 and older, the beneficiary is the oldest never-married female in the family.  These 
two groups consist of people most likely to have had Social Security benefits based on their own 
earnings history, rather than that of their spouse.  If there is neither a male nor a never-married 
female 65 and older, we assign the Social Security beneficiary to be the divorced or widowed 
female that is 65 and older.  We assume that her Social Security benefits are based on the 
earnings of her former or deceased spouse, assumed to be three years older than her, so that the 
“age” of beneficiary is the woman’s age plus three for the purposes of calculating our 
instrument.
5   
                                                 
5  Three years was the median difference in age between male and female spouses in the 1981 New Beneficiary 
Survey.   An additional factor that influences actual Social Security benefit levels for widows is the age at which the 
spouse dies (for widows).  A widow whose husband dies at a relatively young age will receive less than a widow 
whose spouse dies at an older age, due to a longer earnings history for the deceased spouse.  For a divorcee, the age 
at which the marriage ends and the duration of the marriage (for divorcees) are also important factors, as divorcees   15
The instrument is based on the notion that Social Security benefits should be constructed 
to be identical for each year of birth except for changes in the benefits law.  To do so, we first 
assigned an earnings history to the 1916 birth cohort.  The Annual Statistical Supplement 
produced by the Social Security Administration each year contains the median Social Security 
earnings by gender for five-year age groups on a yearly basis for the current year as well as years 
past.  We use median male earnings from these tables.  We assigned median earnings at age 22 
(from the median earnings for ages 20-24 in 1938), age 27 (from median earnings for ages 25-29 
in 1943), etc., in five-year intervals.  We then assume a linear trend in earnings in between these 
five-year intervals.  This method is used through age 60, and earnings are assumed to grow with 
inflation for ages beyond 60.  We do not use median earnings for workers over 60 because many 
of these workers have entered “bridge” jobs, so that the median worker’s earnings at these ages 
may not be representative of workers who have remained in their lifetime jobs through age 65.  
This generates an earnings history for a median male earner in the cohort born in 1916.  We use 
the same earnings profile even when assigning benefits to never married females, because we 
assume that their earnings profile would more closely resemble that of a male worker than that of 
the median female worker.
6   
Importantly, we want our instrument to vary only with changes in Social Security benefit 
rules and do not want to capture changes in earnings profiles due to human capital and 
productivity changes in cohorts over time.  Therefore, we use the earnings history that we 
constructed for the 1916 cohort for all birth cohorts, and simply use the CPI to adjust this 
                                                                                                                                                             
may only claim on their former spouses’ earnings histories if the marriage lasted at least 10 years.   Because the 
March survey did not ask the duration of previous marriages for divorcees or the age at death of the spouse for 
widows, we could not incorporate these factors into the construction of our instrument.   
6 In separate tabulations in the CPS, the median earnings of never married females are significantly more highly 
correlated with male earnings than with the earnings of all females.   16
earnings profile for inflation for earlier and later cohorts.  Thus, all birth cohorts have the same 
real earnings trajectory over time.  By holding lifetime earnings constant by construction, this 
insures that all of the variation in the instrument comes from variation in the benefit formula due 
to the law change.  We also assume that this prototypical earnings history ends at age 65, so that 
we do not incorporate any variation across cohorts in average retirement ages.  So we assume all 
workers retire at age 65; our results are very similar using an instrument that uses a fixed 
distribution of retirement ages from the 1916 cohort. 
Our next step is to input the constructed earnings histories into the Social Security 
Administration’s ANYPIA program.  This program calculates the monthly benefit at retirement 
given a date of birth, date of retirement, and earnings history.  ANYPIA gives the monthly 
benefit at the date of retirement, which is the primary insurance amount (PIA).  We assign 
birthdays of June 2 in the particular year of birth and assume that people retire and claim benefits 
in June of their retirement year to yield a PIAfor that year of birth..
7  Married couples are 
assigned 150% of this PIA. 
The Social Security Administration periodically increases nominal benefits to adjust for 
inflation.  To obtain a value for the predicted benefit for a given age and year-of-birth cohort, we 
need to account for all “cost of living adjustments” (COLA) until the date of interview.  We 
calculate the median month in which a given age and year-of-birth cell was interviewed, and 
administer all COLA adjustments from the time that the person would have retired through this 
date.  This produces a predicted (COLA-adjusted) Social Security monthly benefit for each age 
and year-of-birth cell.  We then multiply by 12 to get the predicted annual benefit.    
                                                 
7 We assume that they claim in June because some cost-of-living (COLA) adjustments were administered in June of 
a given year, rather than December of a given year.  We assume that the beneficiary claims in June so that he will 
receive any COLA in that year.  This prevents variation across years of birth based simply on the timing of the 
COLA.   17
Figure 10 shows the plot of cell mean annual household Social Security income versus 
the instrument by year of birth. The variation in benefits, even conditional on constant earnings 
histories, is readily apparent in the graph of the instrument.  Benefits are rising steadily until 
1910, and then ramp up quickly from 1910 through 1916, before falling precipitously in the 
1917-1921 period, and then rising more slowly thereafter.  The graph of actual Social Security 
incomes by cohort tracks this pattern well, with the benefits notch apparent in the data.  So there 
is a good first stage relationship here: our legislative variation instrument clearly predicts actual 
Social Security incomes.    
 
  Regression Specification 
 
To examine the effect of Social Security on elderly poverty, we estimate the following 
basic specification,   
it it it it u SSIncome P + + ′ = θ δ X     ( 4 )  
where i and t index single year of age and calendar year, respectively.  P  is poverty (or one of 
the other outcome measures used here), SSIncome is the cell mean reported annual Social 
Security income, and u  is a disturbance term. The parameter θ  indicates the change in the 
proportion of elderly in poverty for a change in Social Security income.  X is a vector of all 
other explanatory variables.  We specify  X δ ′  as  
∑ ∑
= =









it i it it D D x α γ β δ X ,    (5) 
where x is a vector of demographic variables that includes controls for cell means of educational 
attainment of the head (high school diploma, some college, and college or advanced degree), 
marital status (married, widowed, and divorced in the pooled sample) white, and female.  By   18
controlling for these cell characteristics, we control for any other trends in cohort characteristics 
that might be correlated with both the legislative changes in benefits determination and with 
poverty.  Following Krueger and Pischke (1992), we also include in (5) a full set of dummies for 
the age of the head, 
i   Age D , and calendar year dummies, 
t   Year D .
8  The age dummies control for 
differences across age groups in the outcome measure; the year dummies control for any general 
time trends in the outcome measure.   
Thus, after controlling for age and calendar year, the variation in SSIncome is based only 
upon year of birth.  When we then instrument with the variable described above, which we 
denote as Z , our model is identified solely by legislative variation in benefits generosity across 
birth cohorts, and not any differences in their earnings history.  The regression analysis is based 
on 950 elderly age-by-year cells.  The means of the dependent variable and primary explanatory 
variable are shown in Table 1 for each sample.
9 
  
Visual  Inspection 
  To illustrate the nature of the regression results that follow, we begin with a visual 
inspection of the data.  Figure 11 shows the average poverty rate at ages 65 and older for each 
birth cohort, graphed against our instrument for that birth cohort.  There is a rapid decline in 
poverty for early cohorts, where benefits are rising, and this rate of decline slows substantially 
after the notch in 1916, although the decline does continue.  This is suggestive of a role for 
benefits, but the correspondence is not particularly striking. 
                                                 
8 The excluded group consists of families with heads’ age over 90, observed in calendar year 2000. 
9 Descriptive statistics for all variables and samples are available in an appendix from the authors.   19
  Figure 12 shows a parallel graph for shared living arrangements.  Once again, there is a 
steep decline in the early years of the sample, when benefits are rising most rapidly, then a 
turnaround and rise in shared living arrangements when Social Security benefits fall and flatten.  
This evidence is very consistent with a benefits effect on shared living arrangements.   
 
V. Estimation  Results 
Basic Results 
Table 2 shows the grouped OLS and IV estimation results for the full sample that 
includes all elderly, where the weights were based on the cell sizes.   Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses.   Each row shows the estimate of θ  for the associated outcome measure.   
Columns 1 and 2 give the grouped OLS and IV estimates of θ  with no other controls, 
respectively.  Column 3 gives the IV estimates with other controls.  In columns 1-3, in which, the 
outcome and Social Security measures are in levels, all coefficients are multiplied by 1000 for 
ease of interpretation; so, the coefficient shows the impact of a real $1000 rise in annual Social 
Security benefits on the outcome.  In column 4, the outcome and the Social Security measures 
are in logs, so that the coefficients are interpreted as elasticities, and column 5 shows the results 
in logs with the X controls.  Panel A gives estimates for elderly households and Panel B for 
families.   
Using the fraction of elderly households below federal poverty threshold (the head-count 
ratio) as the dependent variable (row 1, Panel A), a $1000 increase in annual benefits reduces the 
poverty rate by 2.8 percentage points (column 1).  The IV estimates in columns 2 and 3 imply 
decreases in the poverty rate of 3.5 and 3.1 percentage points without and with controls, 
respectively.   The IV estimates from the log specification with controls in column 5 imply an   20
elasticity of the poverty rate to Social Security benefits of -0.72, so that if benefits were cut by 10 
percent, the poverty rate would be expected to rise by 7.2 percent (not percentage points).    
Over the 1967-2000 period, the poverty rate for this sample fell from 28.3 percent to 11.6 
percent, or by 16.7 percentage points, while the simulated Social Security benefit, Z , rose by 
$5760, or 91%.  Hence, the IV linear estimate in column 3 implies that the increase in Social 
Security benefits of $5760 would lead to a 17.8% decline in poverty rates.  The IV log estimate 
in column 5 implies that the 91% rise in benefits should have led to a 66% decline in poverty 
rates. Both of these estimates are almost exactly the same as the poverty decline experienced by 
these elderly, suggesting that Social Security can explain all of the decline. 
The first row of panel B shows the estimates of θ  for the family-level dataset.  The 
results for elderly families are much stronger.  In column 5, the estimated elasticity of the 
poverty rate to Social Security benefits is -1.38, which suggests that a cut in benefits of 10 
percent would increase the proportion of elderly families in poverty by 13.8 percent.  The IV 
linear estimate in column 3 implies that each $1000 increase in Social Security benefit would 
cause a 5.7 percent decline in elderly poverty.   
At the family level, the poverty rate fell from 39.4 to 16.9%, a decline of 22.5 percentage 
points (57% of base value).  Applied to the $5760 (91%) rise in benefits over this period, both of 
these estimates suggest that, at the family level, poverty actually fell less than it should have 
given the rise in benefits.  The log estimate suggests that family level poverty should have fallen 
by 126% (twice the actual fall), and the level estimate suggests that family level poverty should 
have fallen by 33% (50% larger than the actual fall). 
The second row of Table 2 gives the estimates of θ  for the relative poverty rate.   
Increases in Social Security benefits appear to play a strong causal role in reducing poverty for   21
both the levels and log specifications.  Once again, there is a much stronger effect for elderly 
families than households, a consistent finding throughout the empirical analysis, and one to 
which we return below. 
The third row of each panel shows the estimated impact of Social Security on our 
measure of inequality (the 90-10 difference divided by mean income).  For elderly households, 
there is a significant reduction in inequality, but for elderly families, this finding is very sensitive 
to the inclusion of controls in the model. Overall, the results in Table 2 indicate that Social 
Security has played a very significant role in reducing elderly poverty, measured as (absolute and 
relative) rates and gaps.  However, it may be a fairly blunt instrument at the family level, where 
there are only insignificant declines in inequality. 
The final row of the table shows the impact of Social Security benefits on shared living 
arrangements.  There is a sizeable negative effect, with the log estimate suggesting an elasticity 
of shared living arrangements of 1.8 with respect to the benefit level.  This is an enormous effect, 
much larger than is found in Engelhardt, Gruber and Perry (2003) for their full sample. 
 
Restricting the Time Period 
  One disadvantage of the estimation strategy thus far is that it does not focus explicitly on 
the “notch” variation in benefits.  Much of the identification of the results in Table 2 comes from 
the run-up in benefits from 1885 onwards.  If there is a simple birth-cohort trend in poverty, this 
could be driving much of the results. 
  To address this issue, in Table 3 we reduce the sample of years of birth used to the ten 
years before and after the benefits peak in 1916. We show the results only for the two IV 
specifications including controls, in levels and in logs.   22
  Overall, using these notch years for identification confirms our main finding from Table 
2: there is a sizeable and significant effect of Social Security benefits in terms of reducing elderly 
poverty.  The log results are very similar to Table 2.  The effect on poverty for households rises 
and for families falls, with both converging in an elasticity of -0.8 to -1, which is still large 
enough to more than explain the time series trends in poverty rates.  For the level specification, 
the convergence between household and family results also occurs, but to a much lower level.   
The inequality results also weaken when the sample is restricted, confirming the 
insignificant effect on inequality of these policy changes.  There is also a dramatic reduction in 
the elasticity of shared living arrangements, which falls to -0.34 and is marginally significant.  
This is much closer to the full sample -0.4 estimate in Engelhardt, Gruber and Perry (2002), 
which was estimated on a more restricted set of birth cohorts. 
  
Results by Marital Status 
The pooled sample used in Table 2 combines households of different marital types, some 
of which might be expected to display quite different responsiveness of Social Security to 
poverty.  For example, because most married couples live independently (of other adults) and 
have many potential sources of income with which to support themselves, they may be expected 
to have relatively low sensitivity of poverty to Social Security a priori.  Married couples have a 
much lower baseline rate of poverty than the other groups in our sample: over our sample period, 
the rate of absolute poverty for married couples is 9.5%, while it is 26.5% for divorcees, 24.2% 
for widows, and 21.3% for those never married. 
Tables 4 show estimation results for four different sub-samples, split out by marital 
status.   Once again, we show only the level and log IV specifications, including control   23
variables. Surprisingly, married couples appear to have the most elastic poverty response to 
Social Security, with very large estimated elasticities in Table 4 across the various outcome 
measures.  The responses for other groups are much smaller, and are only significant at the 
household level for widows.  At the family level, the effects are much larger for widows, 
although they remain smaller in elasticity form than for married households.  The results are also 
significant in levels, although much smaller, for widows and the never married at the family 
level. 
One finding that is consistent across all specifications in our analysis is that the impact of 
Social Security on poverty is stronger for elderly families than households.  Indeed, the final row 
of the table shows that for all marital status groups, there is a strong effect of Social Security 
benefits on living in shared arrangements.  The findings here are different than those of 
Engelhardt, Gruber, and Perry (2002), who found a strong effect on living arrangements for 
widows and divorcees, but not for married couples.  These differences are due to differences in 
birth cohorts used; when the sample is restricted to the narrower set of birth cohorts from 1900-
1930, the effects on shared living arrangements are much stronger for the widows and divorcees 
relative to married couples. 
As noted earlier, the fact that Social Security impacts living arrangements can explain the 
much stronger response of family-level poverty measures.  If higher Social Security benefits 
make the widowed and divorced more likely to live independently, they will cause the creation 
of many elderly households that are comparatively poor because they only have elderly in them.  
Therefore, the endogenous response of living arrangements to benefits will bias downward any 
estimated poverty improvement among elderly households. 
   24
VI. Conclusion 
The most frequently cited “victory” in the war on poverty of the 1960s is the dramatic 
decline in elderly poverty.  This poverty decline is typically attributed to the growth in Social 
Security over this period, but to date there has been little direct assessment of the causal role of 
the Social Security program in determining elderly poverty.  We provide such a direct 
assessment by using the variation in the generosity of the Social Security program across birth 
cohorts over the 1885-1930 period.  Our analysis suggests that the growth in Social Security can 
indeed explain all of the decline in poverty among the elderly over this period. 
We also highlight the important sensitivity of poverty measurement to living 
arrangements.  Poverty measured at the family level is much more sensitive to increases in 
program generosity than is poverty measured at the household level. This is consistent with the 
notion that part of the response to rising Social Security benefits is to encourage increased 
independent living among lower-income elders. 
While our results are striking, they are not the final word on this important topic.  A 
particularly important question remains the implications of this increase in elderly income for 
broader measures of well-being, such as consumption.  For example, was this rise in income 
associated one-for-one with increased consumption, or did it serve to crowd out other sources of 
consumption smoothing, such as transfers from family members?  Analysis of these types of 
questions is important for a richer understanding of the welfare implications of Social Security 
program growth.   25
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Notes: Table shows means and standard deviations for selected variables from the CPS data set 
described in text.   28
 



























































































































































Notes: N = 950 for all regressions.  Table shows coefficients of interest from regressions that 
also include the full set of age and year dummies.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
Regressions “with controls” also include controls for the percentage in age/year cell that are: 
female; white; high school graduate; some college; college graduate; advanced degree; married; 
divorced/separated; widowed.  The IV regressions instrument with the simulated Social Security 
benefit described in text.  First three columns are estimated in levels; remaining columns in logs.   29
 
Table 3: Estimation Results Restricting the Time Period to 1906-1926 
 (1) 
IV, with Controls 
(2) 
Log IV, with 
Controls 







































Notes: N = 419 for all regressions.  Table shows coefficients of interest from regressions that 
also include the full set of age and year dummies and controls for the percentage in age/year cell 
that are: female; white; high school graduate; some college; college graduate; advanced degree; 
married; divorced/separated; widowed.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The regressions 
instrument with the simulated Social Security benefit described in text.  First column estimated 
in levels, second in logs. 
  






















































Log IV, with 
Controls 
 




































































































































































































Notes: N = cells for married regressions (first set of two columns), 950 for widowed regressions (second set of two columns), 815 
cells for widowed regressions (third set of two columns), 808 for never married regressions (last set of two columns).  Table shows 
coefficients of interest from regressions that also include the full set of age and year dummies and controls for the percentage in 
age/year cell that are: female; white; high school graduate; some college; college graduate; advanced degree.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  The regressions instrument with the simulated Social Security benefit described in text.  First column in each panel 
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Figure 6: Shared Living Arrangements
calendar year
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Figure 8: Poverty by Age Group
calendar year
 % < povline, age 65-69  % < povline, age 70-74
 % < povline, age 75-79  % < povline, age 80+










Figure 9: Poverty Line by Marital Status
calendar year
 % < povline, married  % < povline, divorced
 % < povline, widowed  % < povline, nev married















































 HH Income from SS  Simulated Benefits























































































 % in Shared Living  Simulated Benefits
1885 1916 1930
.220149
.456379
3382.33
15521.7
  
  44
 